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NOTES
The Appellate Role in Ensuring Justice in Fourth Amendment
Controversies: Ornelas v. United States
The framers of the Bill of Rights intended the Fourth Amend-
ment' to act as a bulwark against unreasonably intrusive searches
2
and seizures by government agents. Justice Robert Jackson, an
eyewitness to the devastating consequences of excessive government
invasions into the private sphere,3 ranked the protections of the
1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) ("[T]he
purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United States against
arbitrary action by their own Government."). Although the text of the Amendment pro-
hibits "unreasonable searches and seizures," the Court has interpreted this reasonableness
requirement to mean that, as a general rule, a warrant is necessary before the police may
search or seize a person or property. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51
(1970). Even while carving out exceptions to the rule, the Court has issued reaffirmations
of this basic principle: "[T]he police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, or [else] in most in-
stances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent
circumstances." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (citations omitted); see also Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (explaining that "[a]n arrest without a warrant bypasses the
safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause and substitutes
instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification"). The warrant
requirement serves several goals important to the relationship between citizen and state:
It guarantees that a neutral magistrate has reviewed the reasons for the requested search
or seizure, see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); it increases the likelihood
that the search or seizure will be executed within lawful bounds, see id.; and it provides
some assurance to the individual subjected to the search that it is done pursuant to legal
authority and not merely at the whim of law enforcement agents, see Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523,532 (1967). The text further demands that a warrant be issued only if
supported by probable cause. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also ARNOLD H. LOEWY &
ARTHUR B. LAFRANCE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ARREST AND DETENTION 1 (1996)
(explaining that the Fourth Amendment includes one substantive requirement-probable
cause, and one procedural requirement-a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate).
3. Justice Jackson's views on police authority were undoubtedly influenced by his
service as the chief prosecutor for the United States in the Nuremberg war crimes trials
following the Second World War. See Philip B. Kurland, Robert H. Jackson, in 4 THE
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
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Fourth Amendment among the most vital in the Constitution:
"Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a
population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in
every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and
most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary govern-
ment."
4
Because evidence crucial to a criminal conviction may be ex-
cluded from use at trial if the government obtains such evidence
through an investigation method that violates the Fourth Amend-
ment, defendants are likely to pursue constitutional challenges.'
These evidentiary challenges often implicate the fundamental requi-
sites of Fourth Amendment law: the satisfaction of the probable
cause6 and reasonable suspicion standards! The proper function of
OPINIONS 1305-09 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1995).
4. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
5. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (requiring exclusion from trial of
evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
393 (1914) (declaring that if evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution were al-
lowed to be used against the defendant at trial, the Fourth Amendment would be "of no
value"). See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1, at 2-24 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter SEARCH & SEIZURE]
(discussing the exclusionary rule); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond:
The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure
Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1983) (detailing the exclusionary rule in search and sei-
zure cases); Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 84 GEO. L.J. 713, 873-86
(1996) (presenting an overview of the exclusionary rule cases).
6. While not susceptible to a precise or formulaic definition, the Court has sketched
several outlines of what probable cause must entail, including the following: "Probable
cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to war-
rant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being
committed.'" Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925)). Chief Justice Marshall authored an oft-cited definition of probable cause:
"[T]he term 'probable cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence
which would justify condemnation; and, in all cases of seizure, has a fixed and well known
meaning. It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion." Locke
v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813). But the Court has often cautioned
that probable cause determinations are not hyper-technical exercises, but are " 'factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act.'" Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar, 338
U.S. at 175).
7. Like probable cause, the exact boundaries of reasonable suspicion are not amena-
ble to easy definition since they are "fluid concepts that take their substantive content
from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed." United States v.
Orelas, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 (1996). However, at least one characteristic of reasonable
suspicion is well-defined: It demands a lesser quantum of proof than does probable cause.
See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). Furthermore, the Court has articulated
rough guidelines for its determination, which focus on particularity: "Based upon [the]
whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for sus-
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the appellate court in reviewing trial court determinations on ex-
cluding evidence was disputed until the Supreme Court's recent
decision in United States v. Ornelas.s Before Ornelas, the United
States courts of appeals had split on the question of whether they
should review trial court determinations of probable cause under a
clear error or a de novo standard.9 The Ornelas majority resolved
the dispute in favor of de novo review, despite questions surrounding
the efficacy of such exacting appellate scrutiny, guaranteeing criminal
defendants at least two opportunities to argue their Fourth Amend-
ment claims. 0
This Note begins by discussing the facts, procedural history, and
opinion of the Court in Ornelas." The Note then examines the am-
biguity at the heart of Ornelas-the dilemma presented by mixed
questions of law and fact.' Analysis of the opinion follows, begin-
ning with a review of Supreme Court1' and courts of appeals
precedent 4 and expanding into an examination of the policy ration-
ales presented by the proponents of the two competing standards of
review. 5 Finally, the Note discusses the potential impact of the deci-
sion on the appellate courts' role in Fourth Amendment
controversies. 6
On December 11, 1992, Detective Michael Pautz of the Milwau-
kee County Sheriff's Department was on duty and engaged in his
usual drug-interdiction surveillance in downtown Milwaukee. His
pecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975)
("Any number of factors may be taken into account in deciding whether there is reason-
able suspicion.").
8. 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
9. Proponents of appellate activism argue that reviewing courts have a constitutional
duty to ensure individual justice. See, e.g., McConney v. United States, 728 F.2d 1195,
1203 (9th Cir. 1984). These proponents support de novo review of Fourth Amendment
rulings, reasoning that since "three heads are better than one," federal appellate courts
are more likely to do justice for particular defendants than are trial court judges. See Paul
D. Carrington, The Power of District Judges and the Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3
GA. L. REV. 507, 527 (1969). Opposing appellate activism are the proponents of deferen-
tial review who doubt that appellate judges are wiser than trial court judges or better able
to dispense justice. See Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate
Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751,781 (1957).
10. See infra notes 51-74 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 17-78 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 95-128 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 129-44 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 145-89 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
17. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1659.
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suspicions were aroused by a 1981 Oldsmobile parked in a motel
parking lot."8 Detective Pautz, a twenty-year police veteran,' 9 noticed
the car because its license plates were from California-a state Pautz
knew to be a "source state"20 for drugs.2' He also knew that older,
two-door General Motors models were favored by criminals secret-
ing drugs."
Pautz began his investigation by calling the police dispatcher for
information on the car's registration and learned that the vehicle was
registered to Miguel Ledesma Ornelas, a resident of San Jose, Cali-
fornia.' However, Pautz forgot which name the dispatcher recited
and later was uncertain whether it was Miguel Ledesma Ornelas or
Miguel Ornelas Ledesma.24 A check of the motel registry revealed
that an Ismael Ornelas had checked in without a reservation at 4:00
a.m. accompanied by a second male." When Pautz's partner, Detec-
tive Donald Hurrle,26 arrived, the two called the local office of the
Drug Enforcement Administration and requested a search of the
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System ("NADDIS")2 7
18.' See id.
19. See id. Detective Pautz was also a two-year veteran of the special narcotics detail.
See id.
20. In his opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner ex-
plained that "California, like other states on the eastern, western, and southern borders of
the United States, is a state from which drugs are shipped to other states, a 'source state.' "
United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1994), on remand, 52 F.3d
328 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996); see
also United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 n.5 (2d Cir. 1980) (identifying
Los Angeles, California as a major "source" of narcotics); Michael J. Mills, Note, Reason-
able Suspicion and the Fourth Amendment: United States v. Sokolow, 23 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 45, 65-66 (1989) (listing Los Angeles, California, as a common American distribution
center for narcotics); Ben Kaufman, Three Dealers in Cocaine Sentenced, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Apr. 27, 1995, at C08 (identifying California as a major source of the narcotics
reaching the Midwest).
21. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1659.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. The court of appeals came to the defense of Pautz's memory lapse:
Confusion on this score is understandable, though not justifiable. Spanish naming
conventions are confusing to non-Hispanic Americans. When a Hispanic has two
surnames, such as Ornelas Ledesma or Ledesma Ornelas, the first is his father's
last name and the second his mother's maiden name... exactly the reverse of the
middle and last names of non-Hispanics.
Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d at 715.
25. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1659.
26. Detective Hurrle was a twenty-five year veteran of the police force. See id.
27. NADDIS is a computer database of known and suspected narcotics criminals. See
Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38
HASTINGS Li. 889, 918 (1987). The data in NADDIS are gathered from informants, sur-
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for the names Ismael Ornelas and Miguel Ledesma Ornelas.28 The
system reported that Miguel Ledesma Ornelas was a known heroin
dealer from El Centro, California, and that Ismael Ornelas, Jr. was a
cocaine dealer from Tuscon, Arizona.2 ' Deputy Luedke and a police
dog trained to uncover narcotics were summoned and Pautz de-
parted for another assignment when they arrived.0
While Officers Luedke and Hurrle waited outside, two men ex-
ited the motel and climbed into the Oldsmobile.3' Hurrle
approached them, identified himself and asked if they possessed any
narcotics.32 The men answered that they did not,33 and upon request
they produced two California driver's licenses identifying them as
Saul and Ismael Ornelas. 34 The men consented to a search of the car
and "appeared calm, but Ismael was shaking somewhat."35 Luedke, a
veteran of two thousand car searches for narcotics, began his task
inside the Oldsmobile without the aid of the police dog.36 Leudke
noticed a loose panel on the passenger door and suspected that the
panel had recently been removed because he noticed a rusty screw
embedded in it.37 His suspicions raised, Leudke removed the panel
and discovered two kilograms of cocaine.3 ' The men were charged
with possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.39
In pre-trial motions the defendants argued for suppression of
the cocaine as evidence, asserting that both their detention in the
parking lot and the search by Leudke were in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.4" The magistrate judge concluded that the officers had
veillance, and the intelligence reports of several federal agencies, including the Drug En-
forcement Administration. See id. This information is made available to law enforcement
agents at both the federal and state levels. See id.
28. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1659.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 1659-60.
33. See id. at 1660.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1994), on re-
mand, 52 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct.
1657 (1996).
40. See id. The initial detention was subject to the restrictions placed on Terry stops.
See id. at 716; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (authorizing a brief stop and
search for weapons by the police when there is a reasonable suspicion to believe the sub-
ject poses an immediate threat to the officer's safety). The search inside the car was
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reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop, but not probable
cause to search the loose door panel." However, the magistrate
judge further held that the presence of the police dog would have
eventually led the police to the cocaine by lawful means." Invoking
the inevitable discovery doctrine,43 the magistrate ruled that the evi-
dence should not be suppressed . The district court reversed the
magistrate judge's probable cause finding and allowed the use of the
evidence, reasoning that discovery of the loose panel was enough to
subject to the probable cause requirement and the automobile exception to the warrant
rule. See Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d at 719. One of the many exceptions that has circum-
scribed the warrant requirement is the automobile exception, which allows police officers
to search an automobile, even in the absence of a warrant, if in their judgment probable
cause exists to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. See Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569-
70 (1991) (holding that a warrantless search of a car on a highway does not violate the
Fourth Amendment if there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a
crime). See generally Twenty-Fifth Annual Review, supra note 5, at 791-94 (compiling and
discussing the major Supreme Court cases establishing the automobile exception to the
warrant rule).
41. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1660. After examining the screw that aroused Luedke's
suspicion, the magistrate judge found that as a matter of fact there was no rust, thus de-
flating Luedke's basis for believing there was probable cause to search behind the panel.
See id.
42. See id.
43. The Supreme Court clarified the inevitable discovery doctrine in Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431 (1984). The doctrine allows the use at trial of evidence obtained by unconsti-
tutional means if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means. See id. at 443-45. But
see id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the prosecution should be required to
demonstrate inevitability at a higher standard of proof than preponderance of the evi-
dence). The Nix Court noted that deterrence of unconstitutional police methods is the
usual rationale for exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. See id. at 442. But where the
evidence would have been discovered independently of the illegal methods, the Court rea-
soned that exclusion would not deter the police, but would put the prosecution in a worse
position than if no violation had occurred: "Suppression, in these circumstances, would do
nothing whatever to promote the integrity of the trial process, but would inflict a wholly
unacceptable burden on the administration of criminal justice." Id. at 447. For further
discussion of the inevitable discovery doctrine, see 5 SEARCH & SEIZURE, supra note 5,
§ 11.4(a), at 240-53; John E. Fennelly, Refinement of the Inevitable Discovery Exception:
The Need for a Good Faith Requirement, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1085 (1991); Steven
P. Grossman, The Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery: A Plea for Reasonable Limitations, 92
DICK. L. REV. 313 (1987); Phillip E. Johnson, The Return of the "Christian Burial Speech"
Case, 32 EMORY L.J. 349 (1983); Stephen H. LaCount & Anthony J. Girese, The
"Inevitable Discovery" Rule, an Evolving Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary
Rule, 40 ALB. L. REV. 483 (1976); Mark Paul Schnapp, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypo-
thetical Independent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137
(1976); Twenty-Fifth Annual Review, supra note 5, at 882-83; Jessica Forbes, Note, The
Inevitable Discovery Exception, Primary Evidence, and the Emasculation of the Fourth
Amendment, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1221 (1987).
44. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1660; see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 443-45 (establishing the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule).
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expand the officer's reasonable suspicion into probable cause."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
an opinion written by Chief Judge Posner, affirmed the district
court's reasonable suspicion determination by applying a clear error
test.4 6 The court chose not to rule on the probable cause issue since
the lower court had never expressly found Leudke's testimony re-
garding the loose panel to be credible. 47  The court of appeals
therefore remanded the case for such a determination. 8 On remand,
the magistrate judge promptly found Leudke's testimony credible,
and the district court again held that probable cause existed for the
search.49 The defendants appealed a second time, and the Seventh
Circuit turned once more to a deferential standard of review in af-
firming the district court's ruling, thus setting the stage for the
Supreme Court debate.
In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court
began its analysis with a discussion of the ephemeral nature of the
two Fourth Amendment standards at issue: "Articulating precisely
what 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause' mean is not possi-
ble."5' The Court dismissed the notion that exacting rules can
provide courts with any guidance in applying these standards and
emphasized the fact-specific nature of such determinations: "They
are instead fluid concepts that take their substantive content from
the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed.
5 2
In denouncing the use of legal formulae in the search for probable
cause, the Court turned to the language of landmark Fourth
Amendment cases for the proposition that such determinations must
be based on " 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
45. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1660.
46. See United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 1984), on re-
mand, 52 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct.
1657 (1996).
47. See icL at 721.
48. See id. at 722.
49. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1661.
50. See id. On review to the United States Supreme Court, both the government and
the defendants argued that the appropriate standard of review for determinations of prob-
able cause and reasonable suspicion in the warrantless search context is de novo review.
See id. at 1661 n.4. The Supreme Court therefore invited a third party to brief and argue
as amicus curiae in support of the lower court's determination that clear error is the ap-
propriate standard of review. See id.
51. Id. at 1661.
52. Id.
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act.' "" Findings of both probable cause and reasonable suspicion,
the Court declared, will turn on the particular facts and circum-
stances of each case.54
The Court next turned its attention to the legal issue upon which
the circuits had split-the proper standard of appellate review for
trial court dispositions of probable cause and reasonable suspicion
questions in the warrantless search context.55 Noting that it had
never expressly deferred to a trial court on such matters,56 the Court
rejected the Seventh Circuit's clear error rule and announced that de
novo appellate review was necessary. Chief Justice Rehnquist of-
fered four justifications for this holding.
First, the Court cited the need to maintain a unitary system of
laws in which all criminal defendants are accorded the same protec-
53. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)); see also Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (outlining the method to be used by courts in
searching for probable cause); Joseph G. Cook, Probable Cause to Arrest, 24 VAND. L.
REV. 317, 319-37 (1971) (detailing historical judicial definitions and interpretations of
probable cause); Twenty-Fifth Annual Review, supra note 5, at 723-28 (compiling and dis-
cussing major Supreme Court cases examining probable cause). See generally 2 SEARCH &
SEIZURE, supra note 5, § 3.2, at 22-88 (discussing the probable cause standard and the
techniques used to test for it).
54. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1661; see also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963)
("Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances."). In applying both the
probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards, the Court has rejected the use of
multi-step tests. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The Court in Gates expressly rejected the
two-pronged probable cause test crafted by the decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. This
discarded approach to probable cause required law enforcement agents to demonstrate
both the reliability and the underlying basis of knowledge of the information upon which
probable cause was predicated. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415-16. The primary defect in this
method of analysis, the Court determined, was its "excessively technical dissection" of
facts that "cannot sensibly be divorced" from each other and its failure to allow a defi-
ciency in one factor to be compensated for by a particularly substantial demonstration of
the other. Gates, 462 U.S. at 234-35. Judges are now instructed to evaluate these stan-
dards in light of the totality of the circumstances. See id. at 238. This approach has been
described by the Court as a "practical, common-sense decision." Id.; see also United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[T]he evidence ... must be seen and weighed
not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field
of law enforcement."). But see Gates, 462 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the majority's use of the word "practical" is merely a subterfuge for an "overly per-
missive attitude towards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment").
55. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1661-63.
56. See id. at 1662; see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1990) (examining
independently the corroborative value of an informant's tip); Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 168-70
(examining independently the basis for probable cause).
57. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1662.
58. See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
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tions.5 A de novo standard provides a means of guaranteeing that
defendants in similar situations are not subjected to wholly inconsis-
tent notions of probable cause." The Court anticipated such an
outcome if" 'the Fourth Amendment's incidence turned on whether
different trial judges draw general conclusions that the facts are suffi-
cient or insufficient to constitute probable cause.' ,61
Second, the Court explained that probable cause and reasonable
suspicion are formless concepts in the abstract and are given mean-
ing only in the context of particular factual circumstances. 62  Giving
substance to these rules through independent de novo review of spe-
cific applications is within the appellate court's" 'primary function as
an expositor of law,'" and provides opportunities to clarify the
meaning of legal principles. 3
Third, the Court argued that judicial efficiency justifies de novo
appellate review.6 Appellate courts have the capacity to preserve
consistency among the judicial pronouncements of a particular juris-
diction, which facilitates the development of clear rules that can be
applied by laymen, such as law enforcement agents, before Fourth
Amendment rights are abridged by an improper search or seizure.65
Finally, the Court noted that appellate review standards can
promote constitutionally-desirable police practices.66 The standard
applied to lower court decisions to issue warrants is highly deferen-
59. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1662.
60. See id.
61. Id. (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 171).
62. See id.
63. Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
64. See id.
65. See id.; see also Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457, 467 (1995) ("[T]he law
declaration aspect of independent review potentially may guide police, unify precedent,
and stabilize the law."). The need for relatively simple rules for practical application of
Fourth Amendment doctrine has been advocated by criminal process commentators be-
cause the Amendment
is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus
ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the
context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged.
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and
requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort
of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but
they may be "literally impossible of application by the officer in the field."
Wayne LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. Cr. REV. 127, 141 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 471
F.2d 1082,1122 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), rev'd, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
66. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1663.
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tial.67 The Court reasoned that if determinations of the legality of
warrantless searches are to be afforded the same deference, the in-
centive for police officers to secure warrants will be destroyed. 8 Law
enforcement agents might then conclude that the additional effort
needed to obtain a warrant was unnecessary since their invocation of
an exception to the general warrant rule would be subject to deferen-
tial scrutiny on appeal.
In the Court's view, analysis of probable cause and reasonable
suspicion involves a two-step process. A court must begin by assem-
bling the historical facts preceding the government action; this
constitutes the court's fact-finding role." The second step requires
application of these facts to the appropriate legal standards.7 ' This
inquiry is often labeled a mixed question of law and fact.72  The
Ornelas Court tempered its holding with a final admonition to ap-
pellate tribunals that recognized the dual nature of judicial scrutiny
in this area: "[A] reviewing court should take care both to review
findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight
to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law
enforcement officers." 73 According to the Court, inferences made by
those closest to the community are important because "[t]he back-
ground facts, though rarely the subject of explicit findings, inform the
judge's assessment of historical facts. 74
Justice Scalia, the only dissenter, wrote in defense of deferential
appellate review. His analysis is primarily concerned with honoring
67. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,236 (1983) (discussing the Fourth Amendment's
"strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant").
68. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1663. The Court explained that "the police are more
likely to use the warrant process if the scrutiny applied to a magistrate's probable-cause
determination to issue a warrant is less than that for warrantless searches. Were we to
eliminate this distinction, we would eliminate the incentive." Id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 1661-62.
71. See id. at 1662.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 1663. Justice Scalia deemed this instruction contradictory to the majority's
primary holding because, under a de novo standard of review, "the 'weight due' to a trial
court's finding is zero." Id. at 1666 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 1663. The Court cited the harshness of the Milwaukee winter as an example
of a background fact in this case that informed the judgments of the law enforcement offi-
cers and the lower court. See id. Daily high temperatures of 31 degrees and only a 38%
chance of sunshine are common. See id. This, the Court reasoned, is a climate that may
well lead a police officer to question the presence of a California-licensed automobile. See
id.
75. See id. at 1663-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the respective institutional advantages of the trial and appellate
courts. 6 Justice Scalia explained that deferential review of mixed
questions of law and fact is appropriate when the trial court can bet-
ter judge such issues, often because of that court's proximity to the
factual presentations at trial and its expertise in grappling with the
probabilities of factual situations." The law-clarifying value of ap-
pellate de novo review was rejected by Justice Scalia, who found
little in the fact-intensive nature of probable cause and reasonable
suspicion determinations that would allow easy application of one
ruling to subsequent cases: "Law clarification requires generaliza-
tion .... Probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations
are.., resistant to generalization. ' 7"
The controversy at the heart of Omelas is whether appellate
courts should review determinations of probable cause and reason-
able suspicion in the warrantless search context under a deferential
or a de novo standard. Taking the field on the side of de novo re-
view are those concerned that appellate courts must not abandon
their role as guarantors of justice; they are met by those whose sup-
port of a deferential standard is premised on a fear of appellate
courts being "sucked into a whirlpool of unending review of fact pat-
terns too peculiar to recur."79 The difficulty with review of these
determinations is that they lie at the border of law and fact, in the
nether world of mixed questions.
Drawing logical distinctions between facts and law has been de-
scribed as a "chicken-and-egg problem."80 In order to formulate a
statement of the governing legal rule in a given situation, the court
must establish the relevant facts; but in order to know what facts are
relevant, it must know what the rule of law demands.81 This dilemma
complicates the judicial decision-making framework, which consists
of three components: fact gathering, law declaration, and law appli-
cation.
76. See id. at 1664-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 1664 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1665 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal Ap-
pellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 236 (1991).
80. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 359 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
81. See id.
82. See id. at 350-51. The three steps of this process are not necessarily followed in
any particular order; the discovery of relevant facts may provoke a refinement of the ap-
plicable legal propositions, and during the evolution of the case both relevant fact and law
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Findings of fact are the historical facts "in the sense of a recital
of external events and the credibility of their narrators."83 They de-
scribe the persons, time, place, actions, and surrounding
circumstances of the dispute.' Law declaration, on the other hand,
does not turn on any particular circumstantial setting, but involves
"formulating a proposition which affects not only the case before
[the judge] but all others that fall within its terms.""
Mixed questions exist on the frontier separating law and fact,
combining elements of both, and eschewing easy identification with
either. 6 The Supreme Court has defined the mixed question as an
inquiry "in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the
rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the
statutory standard." '87 In essence, the judge confronted with a mixed
question must perform the most fundamental of legal tasks: applying
the given facts to the governing proposition of law.88
When the courts are able to classify a determination as one of
fact or of law, well-established standards of review are applicable.89
may undergo multiple changes. See id. at 351.
83. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,309 n.6 (1963); see also Universal Minerals, Inc. v.
C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1981) (defining basic facts as the "historical
and narrative events elicited from the evidence presented at trial, admitted by stipulation,
or not denied").
84. See Jay E. Rosenblum, The Appropriate Standard of Review for a Finding of Bad
Faith, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1546, 1569 (1992); see also ARTHUR BONFIELD &
MICHAEL ASIMOW, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 562 (1989) (defining
basic facts as those that describe what happened, why, and to whom); JAMES B. THAYER,
A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE ATTHE COMMON LAW 190-91 (1898) (defining
facts as things "really taking place"); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 229,235 (1985) (defining basic facts).
85. HART & SACKS, supra note 80, at 350.
86. See Rosenblum, supra note 84, at 1571. Examples of mixed questions of law and
fact include whether a confession was coerced, whether a person acted with malice, or
whether a counterclaim arose out of a same transaction or occurrence. See Martin B.
Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate
Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural
Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1003 (1986).
87. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,289 n.19 (1982).
88. See Lee, supra note 79, at 238 (describing the process as "the same task asked of
law students in their examinations"). Although the tripartite description of the judicial
function is the most widely accepted analysis, other constructions of the judge's task have
been suggested, including a scheme that divides findings into four classifications: historic
fact, inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence, conclusions based on application of
law to fact, and abstract legal rules. See Charles R. Calleros, Title V11 and Rule 52(a):
Standards of Appellate Review in Disparate Treatment Cases-Limiting the Reach of Pull-
man-Standard v. Swint, 58 TUL. L. REV. 403, 412-13 (1983).
89. See Rosenblum, supra note 84, at 1567; Ellen E. Sward, Appellate Review of Judi-
cial Fact-Finding, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1991). But cf. Monaghan, supra note 84, at 233
n.24 (explaining that the law/fact distinction provides little guidance for determining the
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In a civil suit, rules of procedure require appellate courts to accept
the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous."
This standard also has been adopted by the Supreme Court in the
criminal context.9' According to the Court, a clearly erroneous
finding occurs "'when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' ,,92 Legal ques-
tions, however, always are reviewed de novo.93 Application of the de
novo standard requires the appellate court to consider the issue as if
standard of review since the distinction itself is artificial); Rosenblum, supra note 84, at
1568 (noting that the law/fact distinction is often difficult to grasp and that "[t]rial court
determinations resist this bi-polar classification"). When the fact is classified as a
"constitutional fact," such as whether a publication is obscene, a less deferential standard
of review may be appropriate. See Peter B. Rutledge, Comment, The Standard of Review
for the Voluntariness of a Confession on Direct Appeal in Federal Court, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1311, 1328-32 (1996) (discussing the doctrines involved with review of constitutional
facts); see also Frank R. Strong, Dilemmic Aspects of the Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact,"
47 N.C. L. REV. 311, 312-25 (1969) (reviewing U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of the
constitutional fact doctrine in the 1967 term).
90. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). See generally Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a):
Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
645 (1988) (discussing the implications of Rule 52(a) for appellate review). The relevant
section of the rule states: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evi-
dence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. CIV. P.
52(a).
91. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 145 (1986); Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S.
487, 493 (1963). The Supreme Court in Taylor explained that although the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure do not have a counterpart to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a),
"the considerations underlying Rule 52(a)-the demands of judicial efficiency, the exper-
tise developed by trial judges, and the importance of first hand observation ... -all apply
with full force in the criminal context." Taylor, 477 U.S. at 145.
92. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400 (1990) (requiring the appellate court to uphold trial court deter-
minations that fall "within a broad range of permissible conclusions"); Steven Alan
Childress, "Clearly Erroneous": Judicial Review over District Courts in the Eighth Circuit
and Beyond, 51 Mo. L. REV. 93, 98 (1986) (discussing the debate among courts and com-
mentators about the meaning of the clearly erroneous standard); John F. Nangle, The Ever
Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous
Rule" Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 409, 416 (1981) (discussing traditional defini-
tions of the clear error standard). See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 13.4, at 604-05 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the clearly erroneous standard of
review).
93. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (1995); Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988); United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.,
364 U.S. 520, 526 (1961). The Court has explained that even when a court must accept a
lower tribunal's findings of fact, the appellate court is not precluded "from making an in-
dependent determination as to the legal conclusions and inferences which should be drawn
from them." Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. at 526.
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it had never been addressed before, giving no weight to the resolu-
tion of the controversy at the trial level.
94
Prior to Ornelas, the Supreme Court had not expressly adopted
a standard of appellate review for the two crucial Fourth Amend-
ment determinations in the warrantless search context. 95 When the
police search under the aegis of a warrant and the question is
whether there is sufficient probable cause to support the warrant,
there is no dispute that the Court's instructions in Illinois v. Gates96
require the application of a clear error standard of appellate review."
However, the Gates rule has not been applied in the warrantless
search context.98 Not only did the Ornelas majority fail to claim ex-
press precedential guidance in the warrantless search context, but the
ambiguity of its prior position compelled the Court to state in its own
defense: "We have never, when reviewing a probable-cause or rea-
sonable-suspicion determination ourselves, expressly deferred to the
trial court's determination."99 Several decisions of the Court, how-
ever, contain textual hints favoring the de novo review standard. '
Furthermore, the Court's method of evaluation of the probable
cause and reasonable suspicion questions in several other cases also
implies support for that standard.0'
The petitioners in Ker v. California'" challenged the constitu-
94. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991); United States v.
First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967). See generally 9A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2588, at 599
(2d ed. 1995) (discussing the de novo standard of review).
95. See United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1419 (8th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
the Court has not expressly established an appellate standard); Anne Bowen Poulin, The
Fourth Amendment: Elusive Standards; Elusive Review, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 151
(1991) (noting that standards of review for Fourth Amendment questions are in "a state of
flux"). But see Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 301-03 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that the Court is leaning toward applying de novo review of mixed questions of law
and fact generally). For a summary of the standards of review used for mixed questions in
other contexts, see Louis, supra note 86, at 1003-05.
96. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
97. "A magistrate's 'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference
by reviewing courts.'" Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 419 (1969)). There is, however, substantial disagreement among the courts of appeals
regarding the exact meaning of the Gates standard of review. See 5 SEARCH & SEIZURE,
supra note 5, § 11.7(c), at 410-15.
98. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1662.
99. Id.
100. See infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
102. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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tionality of a warrantless search conducted incident to their arrest. 3
The United States Supreme Court stated that although it does not
function as a trial court in resolving multiple factual disputes among
parties, it will, "where necessary to the determination of constitu-
tional rights, make an independent examination of the facts, the
findings, and the record so that it can determine for itself" whether
the evidence supports the probable cause decision!' 4 The next year
in Beck v. Ohio,' the Court reaffirmed its capacity to make an
"independent examination" to ensure that the probable cause stan-
dard had been satisfied by the evidence.0 6
Although these decisions establish an appellate court's right to
independently review the evidence and record when making a prob-
able cause or reasonable suspicion determination, neither expressly
mandates the use of either the de novo or clear error standard.0 7
Since a court may independently review the record while laboring
under either standard, Ker and Beck do not establish the quantum of
error necessary to overturn a trial court ruling.
The Court may have come closer to promulgating a standard of
appellate review in one of its most important modern Fourth
Amendment cases, Brinegar v. United States.'08 At issue in that case
was whether the police had probable cause to arrest Brinegar when
they spotted his car on the highway and suspected him of illegally
transporting alcohol."0 9 Because the Court deemed the facts undis-
puted and remarkably similar to those in Carroll v. United States," in
which probable cause was upheld, the Court supported the probable
cause determination by reasoning that "[i]n the absence of any sig-
nificant difference in the facts [when compared to Carroll], it cannot
be that the Fourth Amendment's incidence turns on whether differ-
ent trial judges draw general conclusions that the facts are sufficient
or insufficient to constitute probable cause.""' This statement seems
103. See id. at 24.
104. Id. at 34.
105. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
106. See id. at 92.
107. See id. at 92-97; Ker, 374 U.S. at 33-34.
108. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
109. See id. at 164.
110. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll, the defendants were stopped on the highway by
federal prohibition agents who suspected them of transporting liquor illegally. See id. at
135-36.
111. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 171. In dissent, Justice Jackson argued that Carroll was
distinguishable from the facts of Brinegar because the trial court in Carroll had determined
that probable cause existed to search a car on the highway suspected of smuggling alcohol,
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to reflect the Court's concern with uniformity of precedent, a goal
that can be achieved most effectively through the adoption of a de
novo standard .
Although prior to Ornelas the Court had provided scant express
instruction on the standard of review question,"' the method it em-
ployed in evaluating probable cause and reasonable suspicion in
several cases implied at least an unwritten adoption of the de novo
rule."4 In United States v. Cortez, s15 the Court reviewed the constitu-
tionality of a highway stop of a vehicle by Border Patrol agents
where probable cause was predicated on a complex web of circum-
stantial evidence. 6 In reversing the lower court, the Court carefully
reconstructed the investigatory history, taking pains to link each
piece of evidence to the inference that could reasonably have been
made by the agents.' 7 The ultimate question for the Court was
"whether, based upon the whole picture, they, as experienced Bor-
der Patrol officers, could reasonably surmise that the particular
vehicle they stopped was engaged in criminal activity.'1. In answer-
ing in the affirmative, the Court made no mention of deferring to the
discretion of the lower court; to the contrary, the Court engaged in
an analysis so detailed that it practically retraced the officers' steps."9
while in Brinegar both the trial and intermediate appellate courts decided that the police
arrest was without probable cause. See id. at 184 (Jackson, J., dissenting). From these
differing procedural histories the Justice reasoned:
If we assume the facts to be indistinguishable, this important distinction emerges
from the decisions: Carroll held only that these facts permitted a District Court,
if so convinced, to find probable cause from them. The Court now holds these
facts require a finding of probable cause. This shift from a permissive to a man-
datory basis is a shift of no inconsiderable significance.
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
112. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1662 (explaining that the "varied results" identified by
the Brinegar Court "would be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of law").
113. See United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1419 (8th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
the Court has not expressly established an appellate standard); Poulin, supra note 95, at
151 (noting that standards of review for Fourth Amendment questions are in "a state of
flux").
114. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1990) (ruling on the corroborative
value of an anonymous informant's tip in supporting reasonable suspicion); United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418-21 (1981) (examining in great detail the inferences made by
the law enforcement officers); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1968) (exploring the rea-
sonable inferences that could have been made by the police); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 159-61 (1925) (examining the facts supporting probable cause).
115. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
116. See id. at 418-22 (analyzing the complex factual inferences made by the law en-
forcement officers).
117. See id. at 418-21.
118. Id. at 421-22.
119. See id. at 418-22.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Similarly, in Terry v. Ohio,20 the Court detailed the events pre-
ceding a police officer's detention of suspected robbers on a public
street and described its task in this way: "We must now examine the
conduct of Officer McFadden in this case to determine whether his
search and seizure of petitioner were reasonable.... , 1  In con-
cluding that the officer had acted reasonably, the Court explored in
depth the inferences a reasonably prudent person could have drawn
from the facts as they unfolded before the police officer. 22 Again, no
mention was made of a need to defer to the conclusions of the trial
court or of errors made by the courts below."z Several other Fourth
Amendment cases seem to fit this general pattern of implicit de novo
review.2 4 But the standard of review was not a question squarely
before the Court in any of these cases, and in each the Court re-
frained from expressly establishing a universal standard.
In contexts outside of search and seizure challenges, the Court
has also addressed the problem of applying a standard of review to
mixed questions of law and fact, even while acknowledging "the
vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and ques-
tions of law."' In determining whether a suspect was in custody for
Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court rejected the argument that
the question was a factual one and that deference must be given to
the conclusions of the state court.126 The Court explained that analy-
sis of the voluntariness of a confession involves an application of the
facts to the law, demanding an independent review while considering
the totality of the circumstances.
27
120. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court held in Terry that a police officer may stop an indi-
vidual for the purpose of a limited investigation when the officer has a reasonable
suspicion that a crime has been or is about to be committed. See id. at 30-31. Further-
more, the Court not only sanctioned the stop in order to question the suspected criminal,
but also allowed a limited frisk of the outer garments of the suspect for the protection of
the police officer and bystanders. See id.
121. Id. at 27.
122. See id. at 27-28.
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1990) (ruling on the corrobora-
tive value of an anonymous informant's tip in supporting reasonable suspicion); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132,159-61 (1925) (examining whether probable cause supported a
highway stop).
125. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (admitting that the Court is
unaware of any rule "that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclu-
sion").
126. See Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457,466 (1995).
127. See id. at 464; see also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985) (explaining that
whether a confession was constitutionally procured was an issue to be resolved by exam-
ining the totality of the circumstances during an independent federal determination).
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While not establishing a fixed rule for the review of mixed ques-
tions of fact and law, the Court has employed a flexible test which
instructs that "deferential review of mixed questions of law and fact
is warranted when it appears that the district court is 'better posi-
tioned' than the appellate court to decide the issue in question or
that probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of
legal doctrine."'2 8 This test demands an issue-by-issue determination
of the usefulness of exacting appellate review and hangs resolution of
the question on a weighing of the policy merits and weaknesses of
the two standards.
The uncertainty created by the Court with regard to the proper
appellate treatment of mixed questions has precipitated a split
among the circuit courts29 with regard to the proper standard of re-
view for search and seizure challenges.'30 The majority of circuits
that have faced the issue have adopted the de novo standard.'
However, several courts have only recently abandoned the deferen-
tial review practice.' A comparison of the Seventh Circuit's
decision in United States v. Spears' and the Ninth Circuit's decision
in United States v. McConney31 provides the sharpest contrast among
the circuits on this issue.
The court in Spears relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Illinois v. Gates'35 to justify clear error review for warrantless
128. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225,233 (1991) (quoting Miller, 474 U.S.
at 114).
129. See infra note 131 (listing the cases involved in the split).
130. See Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 289 n.19 (noting the persuasive support on both
sides of the de novo versus clear error debate); see also United States v. McConney, 728
F.2d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 1984) ("This disarray in standard of review jurisprudence appears
to be pervasive.").
131. Compare United States v. Padro, 52 F.3d 120, 122 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying a de
novo standard of review to determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion in
the warrantless search context); United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 975 (ist Cir. 1994)
(same); United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); United States
v. Ramos, 933 F.2d 968, 972 (11th Cir. 1991) (same); and United States v. Patrick, 899 F.2d
169, 171 (2d Cir. 1990) (same), with United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 268-71 (7th Cir.
1992) (applying a clear error standard of review to determinations of probable cause and
reasonable suspicion in the warrantless search context).
132. The Sixth Circuit's decision in favor of de novo review in Padro overruled its own
preference for clear error review outlined in United States v. Sangiento-Miranda, 859 F.2d
1501, 1508 (6th Cir. 1988). The First Circuit sanctioned a similar reversal in Zapata from
its earlier decision favoring clear error in United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d
780, 783 (1st Cir. 1991).
133. 965 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1992).
134. 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984).
135. 462 U.S. 213 (1988).
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searches. '36 The Gates Court unequivocally established a standard of
review in the context of warrant searches: "[W]e have repeatedly
said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affi-
davit [supporting probable cause] should not take the form of de
novo review.' ' 37 Even though the Court in Gates dealt with a chal-
lenge to the sufficiency of probable cause in the context of a warrant
search, the Seventh Circuit deemed Gates controlling in warrantless
situations as well: "[T]here is little to distinguish a magistrate's
probable cause determination in a warrant case and a district judge's
probable cause determination in a nonwarrant case, appellate review
should be the same for both."'38 The critical similarity between the
two scenarios according to the Spears court is that "[i]t is the front-
line judicial officer in both cases who conducts the initial inquiry,
who concludes there is or is not probable cause, and an appellate
panel should not substitute its judgment in either case."'39
Unlike the Spears court, the Ninth Circuit in McConney adopted
a functional test for mixed questions: "[I]n each case, the pivotal
question is do the concerns of judicial administration favor the dis-
trict court or do they favor the appellate court.' 140  The factors
considered by the court in this measuring of judicial roles "generally
favor the appellate court.' 4' Factors relevant to the capacity and ap-
propriate functions of the courts will favor appellate de novo review
when "the question requires us to consider legal concepts in the mix
of fact and law and to exercise judgment about the values that ani-
mate legal principles.' ' 142  This bias is especially strong when the
question is a. determination of constitutional rights since such ques-
136. See Spears, 965 F.2d at 269 (citing the Gates rule that the standard of review for
determinations to issue warrants is substantial basis to believe probable cause supported
the warrant).
137. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236. Soon after Gates, the Court held that the proper standard
of review in the warrant search context is "whether there is substantial evidence in the
record supporting the magistrate's decision to issue the warrant." Massachusetts v. Upton,
466 U.S. 727,728 (1984) (per curiam).
138. Spears, 965 F.2d at 270.
139. Id. at 271.
140. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1202. No Fourth Amendment issues were raised in this
case, but the court discussed the mixed question problem extensively in the abstract. In
McConney, the police entered the home of a defendant named in an arrest warrant without
awaiting either voluntary admittance or a refusal by the occupants, in apparent violation of
the "knock-notice" rule. See id. at 1198. At issue was whether the 6ircumstances consti-
tuted such an exigency that the police were excused from the requirements of the rule. See
id. at 1199.
141. Id. (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,289 n.19 (1982)).
142. Id.
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tions demand exposition of abstract constitutional principles, not
merely the facts of immediate controversies.
14
The Supreme Court's resolution of this dispute dividing the cir-
cuit courts was difficult to predict given the Court's precedents. The
standard of review question was not at issue in Brinegar or in any of
its progeny. Likewise, the reliance on Gates by proponents of a def-
erential standard may be equally misplaced since Gates contemplated
situations in which the challenged probable cause determination was
made before the issuance of a warrant, a procedure the Court was
anxious to promote.'" Application of deferential review, in light of
this constitutional preference, reasonably follows.
With precedential guidance murky at best, proponents of both
standards of review turned to policy rationales for support. Ulti-
mately, these considerations focus on the relative capacities and
limitations of the district and appellate courts. 145  First, proponents
argued that while addressing individual claims, de novo review al-
lows the appellate courts to unify precedent, which serves the goal of
"providing law enforcement officers with a defined 'set of rules
which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct deter-
mination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified
in the interest of law enforcement.' ,,146 At the heart of this judicial
task is efficiency.1 47 By unifying precedent, the appellate courts may
reduce the incidence of constitutional transgressions, thereby reduc-
ing the burden on the courts while increasing public welfare. 48
143. See id. at 1203 (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963), in which the Su-
preme Court required de novo review of probable cause determinations).
144. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (noting that under Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine there is a "strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a
warrant").
145. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991) ("[D]eferential re-
view of mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when it appears that the district court
is 'better positioned' than the appellate court to decide the issue in question ... ." (quoting
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985))). It has even been suggested that "the labels
'law' and 'fact' often amount to little more than divisions of decision making authority
between judges and juries or between appellate courts and trial courts." Lee, supra note
79, at 236.
146. Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1662; see also Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457, 467
(1995) (explaining that precedent unification may "stabilize the law"); Poulin, supra note
95, at 152 (arguing that deferential review would result in mixed judicial signals being sent
to law enforcement officers, which is "far from precise fourth amendment protection").
147. Another efficiency rationale supporting de novo review is that "fa]ppellate judges
also have the luxury of distanced reflection, which might undo the ill effects of trial court
impetuosity in some cases." Lee, supra note 79, at 251.
148. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1662 (quoting New York v. Belton, 458 U.S. 454, 458
(1981)).
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The Ornelas Court, however, seemed to acknowledge the im-
practicality of the efficiency through law clarification rationale. The
creation of a set of rules for easy use by street-level law enforcement
agents requires generalization of legal rules. '49 The Court has often
warned that probable cause and reasonable suspicion are "not read-
ily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."'"5 The
Ornelas Court even conceded this point by citing Gates for the
proposition that "'one determination will seldom be a useful prece-
dent for another.' ,15' As the Court explained, however, fact patterns
similar enough to merit constitutional comparison do occur, even if
infrequently.1 52 In these cases at least, de novo review functions effi-
ciently, allowing a reviewing court to apply the holding in a prior
case to a later one. But by the Court's own admission, this possibil-
ity of comparison is the exception, compelling Justice Scalia to ask
"why we should allow the exception to frame the rule.
1 53
The uniqueness of the factors supporting probable cause in
Ornelas bolsters Justice Scalia's view. The Court reasoned that be-
cause it was December, when Californians would be unlikely to be
vacationing in Milwaukee, the police were justified in paying special
attention to Mr. Ornelas's car."' The police officers also claimed that
149. See id. at 1665 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). The Ornelas majority quoted this
warning approvingly. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1661 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232).
Judge Posner, in holding that in the civil context mixed questions are subject to deferential
review, reasoned: "Review is deferential precisely because it is so unlikely that there will
be two identical cases; the appellate court's responsibility for maintaining the uniformity of
legal doctrine is not triggered." Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 606 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting
that where the mixed question at issue involved whether plaintiff had possession of paint-
ings, appellate review of the facts de novo would be a waste of judicial resources since the
facts in this case were unlikely to recur; therefore the appellate court would be unable to
establish a general rule that could be applied in future cases).
151. Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1662 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 n.11).
152. For example, the Court demonstrated that it had previously acknowledged the
factual similarities in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989), and Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491 (1983). See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1662. In both cases, a defendant suspected of
drug trafficking used an assumed name, paid cash for airline tickets, passed through Mi-
ami, and appeared nervous to narcotics agents. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 3-5; Royer, 460
U.S. at 493-95.
153. Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1665 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia likened the value
of de novo review in these cases to that in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985),
in which the Court warned of depleting judicial resources for the sake of" '[d]uplication of
the trial judge's efforts in the court of appeals,'" when it "'would very likely contribute
only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination.'" Ornelas,. 116 S. Ct. at 1665
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574-75).
154. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1663. The Court explained that "what may not amount
to reasonable suspicion at a motel located alongside a transcontinental highway at the
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a late model two-door General Motors car was likely to arouse their
suspicions because of its common use by drug traffickers.' The
Court's analysis of this issue suggests that if this incident were to re-
cur exactly, except that the car involved was a four-door General
Motors model or that the incident took place in the summer, reason-
able suspicion would be lacking. The facts of the Ornelas search are
not particularly complex; many searches involve far more intricate
fact patterns,156 thereby limiting the appellate role in establishing
clear rules for law enforcement officers applicable to general sce-
narios. If the value of law clarification rests in judicial efficiency,
then the infrequent recurrence of complex fact patterns would seem
to overwhelm any value derived from the exceptions.'57
Furthermore, any efficiency gains of de novo review must be
weighed against efficiency losses in other areas of the appellate func-
tion. 5 Were the appellate courts not engaged in resolving the
specific conflicts of individual parties by exercising de novo review,
more energy might be channeled into "developing uniform, princi-
pled doctrine" that is a "more efficient use of a scarce resource (i.e.,
appellate court time) than is attempting to ensure just results in indi-
vidual cases."'5 9  But an obstacle to the persuasive use of the
efficiency rationale by either side of the debate is the lack of empiri-
cal data proving the efficacy or waste associated with a de novo rule
in mixed-question situations.6 Unlike other policy factors at issue,
efficiency must focus only on the actual consequences of a judicial
decision. Whether appellate resources are more efficiently utilized
height of the summer tourist season may rise to that level in December in Milwaukee." Id.
155. See id. at 1662.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418-22 (1981) (analyzing the com-
plex factual inferences made by law enforcement officers based on a variety of
circumstantial evidence, estimates, and surmises).
157. As proof of the rarity of fact pattern repetition, Justice Scalia identified ten facts
that were component parts of the probable cause determination in Ornelas, such as the
loose panel in the car door and the defendant's lack of motel reservations, and concluded
that "the absence of any one of these factors in the next case would render the precedent
inapplicable." Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1665 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. See Lee, supra note 79, at 250-52.
159. Id. at 250. Judge Posner has warned of the costs of plenary appellate review of
mixed questions: "[T]he appellate court's ... main responsibility is to maintain the uni-
formity and coherence of the law, a responsibility not engaged if the only question is the
legal significance of a particular and nonrecurring set of historical events." Mucha v. King,
792 F.2d 602, 605-06 (7th Cir. 1986). Another possible efficiency loss created by de novo
review is a higher appeal rate. See Lee, supra note 79, at 251.
160. See Lee, supra note 79, at 251 ("We do not know whether appellate courts that
apply fact to law during plenary review reach results that produce greater net satisfaction
among litigants and society than do results reached by trial courts.").
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in reviewing trial court determinations for precise correctness or in
clarifying broad legal rules is a question to which the answer can only
be surmised, since no data exist to assist this examination. Advo-
cates must therefore turn to other factors for justification.'
The Ornelas Court also cited the importance of the law declara-
tion role of appellate courts as a justification for de novo review.' 2
The Court argued that certain legal rules have meaning only when
applied to particular factual circumstances.'63 Under a deferential
standard of review, appellate courts would abandon their function as
expositors of the law to the district courts in certain areas, such as
probable cause, where the text of the rule itself provides little guid-
ance for application.1"
The nature of mixed questions of law and fact, however, may
counsel against appellate forays into detailed factual analysis given
the institutional limitations on appellate courts generally. While trial
courts hear live testimony and are immersed in the factual minutiae
of a dispute, the appellate court never has this "intimate familiarity
with the details of the case."'6 5 Because determinations of probable
cause and reasonable suspicion are based on the totality of the cir-
161. See id. at 251-52; see also infra notes 162-85 and accompanying text (discussing
other justifications for de novo review, which include the law declaration role of the ap-
pellate courts, encouragement of the use of warrants, and appellate protection of
constitutional rights).
162. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1662.
163. See id. The Court explained that because the standards for probable cause and
reasonable suspicion are given meaning only through application to specific fact patterns,
de novo review is "necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify
the legal principles." Id.
164. See id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). The Court has also
stated that de novo review is appropriate when "the content of the rule is not revealed
simply by its literal text, but rather is given meaning through the evolutionary process of
common-law adjudication." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502
(1984). However, an appellate court's ability to declare the law is limited by the con-
straints on its time, which has resulted in a strengthening of the power of the trial courts.
See Louis, supra note 86, at 1006.
165. Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1664 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945) (explaining that when an appellate court
decides a case in which witnesses proffered testimony, "the appeal must be decided upon
an incomplete record, for the printed word is only a part, and often by no means the most
important part, of the sense impressions which we use to make up our minds"); Brent E.
Kidwell, Note, A Nation Divided: By What Standard Should Fourth Amendment Seizure
Findings Be Reviewed on Appeal?, 26 IND. L. REv. 117, 133 (1992) (asserting the trial
court's expertise in judging witnesses and weighing the evidence). But see 5 SEARCH &
SEIZURE, supra note 5, § 11.7(c), at 402 (discussing that appellate courts have the advan-
tage of not being consumed by the arduous process of hearing evidence and have more
time to reflect upon the key legal questions).
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cumstances, and not precise factual formulae, direct exposure to the
evidence in a case acquires heightened importance.'66 Additionally,
trial courts are more adept than appellate courts in dealing with
facts.'67 When mixed questions in contexts outside of the Fourth
Amendment have entailed the application of complex fact patterns
to a fluid legal standard, the Court has required a deferential stan-
dard.68
One example of the Supreme Court's application of deferential
review in a legal dispute deemed highly fact-intensive by the Court is
Commissioner v. Duberstein,' 69 a case in which the question posed
was whether payments from a business associate could constitute a
gift, thereby making the payments excludable from taxation."" The
Court deferred to the judgment of the lower court because such a
fact-intensive, non-technical determination "must be based ulti-
mately on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience
with the mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts of
each case.''
Similar reasoning in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp."2 led the
Court to apply a deferential standard to the determination of
whether an attorney had a reasonable belief that a suit brought by
the attorney was not frivolous under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."3 Given it's superior knowledge of the facts, the
Court held that the trial court was better positioned than the court of
appeals to "apply the fact-dependent legal standard."' 74 Thus, an
analysis of the functional capacities of the courts reveals the trial
court's superiority in mastering complex fact patterns and seems to
favor deferential review.
The Ornelas Court also reasoned that de novo review encour-
166. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991) (encouraging defer-
ence to the court better positioned to decide the issue).
167. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,574 (1985) ("The trial judge's major
role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes exper-
tise.").
168. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399-405 (1990) (involving a
frivolous claim suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11); Commissioner v. Duber-
stein, 363 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1960) (involving the question of whether certain business
transactions constituted a gift under the tax laws); infra notes 169-74 and accompanying
text (discussing these cases).
169. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
170. See id. at 279-80.
171. Id. at 289.
172. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
173. See id. at 399-405.
174. Id at 402.
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ages the constitutionally desired use of warrants by law enforcement
officers.175 The constitutional preference for searches and seizures
executed pursuant to warrants legitimizes policies that encourage the
police to obtain warrants prior to intrusive conduct.176  The Court
determined that "police are more likely to use the warrant process if
the scrutiny applied to a magistrate's probable-cause determination
to issue a warrant is less than that for warrantless searches.' 7 7 This
finding supports maintaining the distinction between the deferential
review accorded searches by warrant and the de novo review applied
to searches without a warrant. While Gates favored deferential re-
view of magistrates' decisions to issue warrants in order to encourage
their use,17' applying a deferential standard to post-hoc determina-
tions of the constitutionality of warrantless searches does nothing to
encourage the use of warrants, since the search has already taken
place.
Contrary to the Court's analysis, even under a deferential re-
view regime police officers who obtain warrants before conducting
searches or seizures will benefit from advantages developed by the
Court to advance law enforcement interests that are not available for
warrantless searches. 179 For example, evidence discovered by an offi-
cer armed with a warrant, who in good faith relies on that warrant, is
admissible in court even if the probable cause underlying it is later
found to be lacking.80 Furthermore, the courts have a policy of vali-
dating warrants in cases where the probable cause question is close.'
These judicial preferences remain as incentives to law enforcement
officers to obtain warrants, so it is not clear that de novo review fur-
thers a constitutional preference.
Appellate protection of constitutional rights is offered by de
175. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1663.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,236 (1983).
179. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1666 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Only a warrant can provide
this assurance that the fruits of even a technically improper search will be admissible. Law
enforcement officers would still have ample incentive to proceed by warrant.").
180. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984).
181. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 237 n.10; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109
(1965) ("[T]he resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely de-
termined by the preference to be accorded to warrants."); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257,270 (1960) (explaining that the reason for judicial deference to warrants in close cases
is the importance of encouraging the police to use the warrant system). But see Poulin,
supra note 95, at 152 (arguing that judicial deference to warrants leads to police domina-
tion of the warrant process since appellate courts defer to trial courts and trial courts often
defer to the police).
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novo proponents as another policy justification. Although the Court
did not expressly hold that constitutional rights require more intense
scrutiny by appellate courts than other matters, it did note that var-
ied conceptions of what the Fourth Amendment demands would "be
unacceptable" in a judicial system that values uniformity of the law.'82
Moreover, precedent in other constitutional realms supports this no-
tion. In a case in which First Amendment values were at stake, the
Court stressed the importance of correct judicial determinations
when constitutional rights are implicated: "[T]he constitutional val-
ues protected by the rule make it imperative that judges-and in
some cases judges of this Court-make sure that it is correctly ap-
plied."'' The Court has even regarded independent appellate review
of determinations of rights as a "duty of constitutional adjudica-
tion."' 4 If this special appellate scrutiny of constitutional rights does
impact the determination of the appropriate standard of review,
cases cited by the proponents of deferential review, such as Duber-
stein, which demand lesser scrutiny of fact-intensive mixed questions,
are easily distinguished. Neither Duberstein nor Cooter & Gell in-
volved a constitutional right. 5 Therefore, this policy factor seems to
favor de novo review.
Finally, some commentators are critical of an appellate role in
the judicial system that, in their view, has overstepped its rightful
bounds. 6 External constraints on the courts of appeals are few since
Supreme Court review is limited to only a small fraction of their de-
cisions.87  This void creates a dilemma for courts since "[v]isible
constraints on the judicial decision-making process ... enhance the
182. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1662; see also Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall:
Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723,725 (1992) (noting that
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments are particularly in need of judicial protection
because of the inherent upper-hand police have in their dealings with the public).
183. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,502 (1984).
184. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,515 (1963).
185. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text (discussing Duberstein and Cooter
& Gell).
186. See Lee, supra note 79, at 248-49 (citing LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 392-94
(1930), and Wright, supra note 9, at 751, as critics of the "creeping usurpation of trial court
prerogatives by appellate courts"). One commentator counts Chief Justice Ellsworth as a
critic of expansive appellate powers because of his observation that " 'it cannot be deemed
a denial of justice, that a man shall not be permitted to try his ca[u]se two or three times
over.'" Wright, supra note 9, at 780-81 (misquoting Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
321, 329 (1796), by changing "cause" to "case").
187. See Lee, supra note 79, at 252-53. In comparison, external constraints on the dis-
trict courts are strong since as a matter of right final judgments of those courts are
appealable. See id. at 252.
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credibility and moral force of judicial pronouncements.""' Internal
constraints, those imposed by the court itself, therefore attain magni-
fied importance. One such restriction on the progression of
unchecked appellate power is "an obligation to accord deference to
another decision maker."' s9 Opponents of appellate activism gener-
ally, and those concerned with the political legitimacy of the
appellate courts, should therefore favor deferential review as an in-
ternal constraint.
Despite the Court's hints in favor of de novo review, precedent
did not command the holding in Ornelas since the standard of review
question never squarely appeared before the Court in Brinegar or its
progeny.9 Likewise, the application of the Gates standard by defer-
ential review proponents seems inapposite given the important
differences between the warrant and warrantless search contexts. 9'
The policy considerations also are conflicting-in the final analysis
efficiency cannot justify adoption of either standard because of the
lack of data regarding the best use of appellate energies.'9,
Two factors, however, seem to favor deferential review: the
functional capacities of the courts and the lack of precedential value
in de novo review. Probable cause and reasonable suspicion are
highly fact-driven determinations, and trial courts benefit from a van-
tage that promotes a deeper comprehension of the facts and context
of a trial.9 3 Appellate courts must rely on the written record and
188. Id. at 254.
189. Id. at 255.
190. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1990) (ruling on the corroborative
value of an anonymous informant's tip in supporting reasonable suspicion); United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418-21 (1981) (examining in great detail the inferences made by
the law enforcement officers); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1968) (exploring the rea-
sonable inferences that could have been made by the police); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 171 (1949) (implicitly applying a de novo review by exploring the factual
inferences); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159-62 (1925) (examining the facts
supporting probable cause).
191. When, as in Gates, the issue is whether a warrant is supported by probable cause, a
deferential standard of review is appropriate in order to promote the Constitution's pref-
erence for warrants. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); 5 SEARCH & SEIZURE,
supra note 5, § 11.7(c), at 410-12 (discussing the Gates standard of review).
192. See Lee, supra note 79, at 251 (noting that no data exist to support the view that
plenary review by appellate courts produces a more efficient judiciary).
193. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1664 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("An appellate court never
has the benefit of the district court's intimate familiarity with the details of the case-nor
the full benefit of its hearing of the live testimony."); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra
note 92, § 13.4, at 604 (noting the trial court advantage in viewing the witnesses and the
appellate court's lack of demeanor evidence); 5 SEARCH & SEIZURE, supra note 5,
§ 11.7(c), at 401 (discussing advantages of the trial courts in reviewing evidence).
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therefore lack the ability to judge the credibility of evidence and to
accord appropriate weight to the evidence in light of the totality of
the trial. The low precedential value of probable cause and reason-
able suspicion determinations also favors the application of a
deferential standard of review. Since each case will require inde-
pendent determination of probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
the appellate court adds little to this function given the impracticality
of promulgating rules of universal application.194
One significant factor, however, does favor de novo review-
protection of constitutional rights. Abandonment to the trial courts
of rights as vital to our social compact as those guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment seems nearly a dereliction of appellate duty.
Protection of our highest freedoms ought not be relegated only to
the lowest courts in the federal system.'95 Ultimately, the standard of
review dilemma must be resolved by gauging whether deferential
review can adequately safeguard the Fourth Amendment's mandates
or whether the demands of judicial efficiency are so great that they
trump these constitutional concerns.
The practical impact of the Court's decision in Ornelas seems
less weighty than the theoretical issues surrounding it. Determina-
tions in the Seventh Circuit, at least, will be conducted under a new
standard of review, but the other circuits already conform to the dic-
tates of Ornelas."9 ' The impact on the Supreme Court itself should
be minimal as well. Although the Court has never expressly stated
that de novo review was required in these cases, examination of the
Court's opinions in cases such as Cortez197 reveals a method of judi-
194. See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1661 (citing Gates for the proposition that multi-faceted
probable cause determinations are seldom useful as precedents for later cases). Judge
Posner, in holding that in the civil context mixed questions are subject to deferential re-
view, reasoned: "Review is deferential precisely because it is so unlikely that there will be
two identical cases; the appellate court's responsibility for maintaining the uniformity of
legal doctrine is not triggered." Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 606 (7th Cir. 1986).
195. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 171 (1949) (explaining that allowing
the trial court determination too much deference would allow the probable cause question
in similar cases to "turnf] on whether different trial judges draw general conclusions that
the facts are sufficient or insufficient to constitute probable cause"); see also Ornelas, 116
S. Ct. at 1662 (citing with approval the Brinegar warning against excessive deference to
the trial courts).
196. See United States v. Padro, 52 F.3d 120, 122 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying a de novo
standard of review to determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion in the
warrantless search context); United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 975 (1st Cir. 1994)
(same); United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); United States
v. Ramos, 933 F.2d 968, 972 (11th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908 (1992);
United States v. Patrick, 899 F.2d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 1990) (same).
197. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418-21 (1981); see supra notes 115-19 and
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cial decision-making that can only be predicated on de novo review.
It is likely that the Court's post-Ornelas decisions will employ the
same exacting scrutiny as the pre-Ornelas decisions, albeit under the
authority of an express standard of review rather than an implied
one.
JEFFREY M. GRYBOWSKI
accompanying text (discussing the Cortez case).
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